Abstract-In the problem of secure message transmission in the public discussion model (SMT-PD), a sender wants to send a message M S ∈ {0, 1} to a receiver privately and reliably. Sender and receiver are connected by n channels, also known as simple wires, up to t < n of which may be maliciously controlled by a computationally unbounded adversary, as well as one public channel, which is reliable but not private. The SMT-PD abstraction has been shown instrumental in achieving secure multiparty computation on sparse networks, where a subset of the nodes are able to realize a broadcast functionality, which plays the role of the public channel. In this paper, we present the first SMT-PD protocol with sublinear (i.e., logarithmic in , the message length) communication on the public channel. In addition, the protocol incurs a simple-wire communication complexity of O( n/n − t), which, as we also show, is optimal. By contrast, the best known bounds in both public and simple channels were linear. Furthermore, our protocol has an optimal round complexity of (3, 2), meaning three rounds, two of which must invoke the public channel. Finally, we ask the question whether some of the lower bounds on resource use for a single execution of SMT-PD can be beaten on average through amortization. In other words, if sender and receiver must send several messages back and forth (where later messages depend on earlier ones), can they do better than the naïve solution of repeating an SMT-PD protocol each time? We show that amortization can indeed drastically reduce the use of the public channel; it is possible to limit the total number of uses of the public channel to two, no matter how many messages are ultimately sent between two nodes. (Since two uses of the public channel are required to send any reliable communication whatsoever, this is the best possible.) Index Terms-Cryptographic protocols, almost-everywhere secure computation, information-theoretic security, randomness extractors, secure message transmission.
communication in the information-theoretic setting. Generally speaking, an SMT protocol involves a sender, S, who wishes to transmit a message M S to a receiver, R, using a number n of channels ("wires"), some of which are controlled by a malicious adversary A. The goal is to send the message both privately and reliably. Since its introduction, SMT has been widely studied and optimized with respect to several different settings of parameters (for example-and non-exhaustively, see [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] ).
Garay and Ostrovsky [7] studied a model they called Secure Message Transmission by Public Discussion (SMT-PD) as an important building block for achieving secure multi-party computation [8] , [9] on sparse (i.e., not fully connected) networks. (An equivalent setup was studied earlier in a different context by Franklin and Wright [10] .) In this model, in addition to the wires in the standard SMT formulation, called "simple" wires from now on, S and R gain access to a public channel which the adversary can read but not alter. In this new setting, secure message transmission is achievable even if the adversary corrupts up to t < n of the simple wires-i.e., up to all but one.
We remark that for the "by Public Discussion" part of the name in the SMT-PD problem formulation, Garay and Ostrovsky drew inspiration from the seminal work on privacy amplification and secret-key agreement by Bennett et al. [11] , [12] where two honest parties can also communicate through a public and authentic channel, as well as through an additional, unauthenticated channel which an adversary can partially eavesdrop or tamper. This problem has been studied extensively over the years under different variants of the original model. In a sense and at a high level, SMT-PD can be considered as a specialized instance of the original privacy amplification model, for a specific structure of the non-public communication. Namely, we view the communication over the multiple simple wires between S and R as "blocks" over the unauthenticated channel, and introduce a specific adversarial tampering function in which one of the blocks is to remain private and unchanged.
The motivation for the SMT-PD abstraction comes from the feasibility in partially connected settings for a subset of the nodes in the network to realize a broadcast functionality despite the limited connectivity [13] [14] [15] , 1 which plays the role of the public channel. (The simple wires would be the multiple paths between them.) As such, the implementation of the public channel in point-to-point networks is costly and highly non-trivial in terms of rounds of computation and communication, as already the sending of a single message to a node that is not directly connected is simulated by sending the message over multiple paths, not just blowing up the communication but also incurring a slowdown factor proportional to the diameter of the network, and this is a process that must be repeated many times-linear in the number of corruptions for deterministic, error-free broadcast protocols (e.g., [16] ), or expected (but high) constant for randomized protocols [17] , [18] .
A main goal of this work is to minimize the use of this expensive resource, both in terms of communication as well as in the number of times it must be used when sender and receiver must send many messages back and forth, as it is the case in secure multi-party computation. We first present an SMT-PD protocol with a logarithmic (in , the message length) communication complexity on the public channel; the best known bound, due to Shi, Jiang, SafaviNaini, and Tuhin [19] , was linear (see related work below). In addition, our protocol incurs a simple-wire communication complexity of O( n n−t ), which, as we also show, is optimal, thus providing an affirmative answer to the question posed in [19] of whether the O(n) simple transmission rate could be improved. (Here transmission rate refers to the communication complexity divided by message length-see Section II for formal definitions of these terms.) Furthermore, our protocol has an optimal round complexity of (3, 2), meaning 3 rounds, 2 of which must invoke the public channel [19] .
Regarding the number of times the public channel must be used when considering SMT-PD as a subroutine in a larger protocol, we ask the question whether some of the lower bounds on resource use for a single execution of SMT-PD can be beaten on average through amortization. In other words, if a sender and receiver must send several messages back and forth (where later messages depend on earlier ones), can they do better than the naïve solution of repeating an SMT-PD protocol each time, incurring a cost of three rounds and two public channel transmissions per message? We show that amortization can in fact drastically reduce the use of the public channel: indeed, it is possible to limit the total number of uses of the public channel to two, no matter how many messages are ultimately sent between two nodes. (Since two uses of the public channel are required to send any reliable communication whatsoever, this is the best possible.)
A. Prior Work
The first variant of SMT considered in the literature is perfectly secure message transmission (PSMT), in which both privacy and reliability are perfect [1] . It is shown in the original paper that PSMT is possible if and only if n ≥ 2t + 1. For such n, 2 rounds are necessary and sufficient for PSMT, while one-round PSMT is possible if and only if n ≥ 3t + 1.
The communication complexity of PSMT depends on the number of rounds. For 1-round PSMT, Fitzi et al. [5] show that transmission rate ≥ n n−3t is necessary and sufficient. (Recall that n > 3t is required in this case.) For 2-round PSMT, Srinathan et al. [3] show that a transmission rate ≥ n n−2t is required; 2 this was extended in [20] , which showed that increasing the number of rounds does not help. Kurosawa and Suzuki [6] construct the first efficient (i.e., polynomial-time) 2-round PSMT protocol which matches this optimal transmission rate.
A number of relaxations of the perfectness requirements of PSMT are considered in the literature to achieve various tradeoffs (see for example [21] for a detailed discussion of variants of SMT). The most general version of SMT (or SMT-PD) is perhaps ( , δ)-SMT. We call a protocol for SMT(-PD) an ( , δ)-SMT(-PD) protocol provided that the adversary's advantage in distinguishing any two messages is at most , and the receiver correctly outputs the message with probability 1 − δ. The lower bound n ≥ 2t + 1 holds even in this general setting (at least for non-trivial protocols, such as those satisfying + δ < 1/2); hence the most interesting case for SMT-PD is the case when the public channel is required: t < n ≤ 2t. As noted above, this requires round complexity (3,2) [19] . Franklin and Wright [10] show that perfectly reliable (δ = 0) SMT-PD protocols are impossible when n ≤ 2t. On the other hand, perfect privacy ( = 0) is possible, and is achieved by previous SMT-PD constructions (see below).
The communication complexity lower bounds noted above all apply to PSMT; for more general SMT bounds, we are aware only of [22] . They consider the problem of almostsecure message transmission, which is only slightly less restrictive than PSMT. Namely, the problem requires perfect privacy, and that the Receiver never output an incorrect message, though he may output "failure" with probability δ. The authors show that in this model, there is a communication complexity lower bound of n( + log(1/δ)) (up to an additive constant).
A number of protocols for SMT-PD appear in previous work. The first such comes in [10] as a consequence of the equivalence shown there between networks with multicast and those with simple lines and broadcast (i.e., the public discussion model). Their solution has optimal round complexity (3, 2); 3 however, when t < n < 3t 2 (including the worst case t = n + 1), their protocol has (pick your poison) either positive privacy error > 0, or exponential communication complexity. Garay and Ostrovsky [7] first describe a (4,3)-round (0, δ) protocol which was subsequently improved to (3, 2) rounds. The protocol has linear transmission rate (in terms of message length) on the public and simple channels. Shi et al. [19] give the first protocol with constant transmission rate on the public channel (for messages of sufficient, modest size); however, the communication complexity on the public channel is still linear. (They maintain a linear transmission rate on simple channels as well.) 
B. Our Contributions
By contrast, we obtain the first round-optimal SMT-PD protocol with sublinear (logarithmic) communication complexity on the public channel. More specifically (and assuming for simplicity δ = O(1)), our protocol has public channel communication complexity O n log n log n n−t for messages of sufficient length, as compared with O( ) in the protocol of [19] . (The message length required by either protocolnamely, / log = (n log n) for ours, 4 or = (n 2 ) for that of [19] -means that O n log n log n n−t is an (asymptotic) improvement over O( ) for all values of n, for which the claimed complexities hold, as n cannot be "large" compared to .) The protocol also enjoys a simple-wire communication complexity of O( n n−t ), which (just by itself) improves on previous constructions and, as we also show, is optimal. See Fig. 1 for a comparison of the communication complexity of our protocol and previous ones. At a high level, the protocol has the same structure as previous 3-round SMT-PD protocols, with the following important differences: (1) our use of randomness extractors allows us to reduce the amount of transmitted randomness, which is reflected in the gain in simple-wire communication, and (2) typically in previous protocols the message is transmitted in the last round over the public channel, blinded by the simplewire randomness thought not to have been tampered with; our improvement to public communication comes from the transmission of the (blinded) message on the simple wires, provided that the sender authenticates the transmission making use of the public channel, which in turn requires smaller communication. Additionally, we achieve these improved communication bounds even for messages of smaller required size than Shi et al. [19] . 5 Finally, the protocol achieves perfect privacy.
We arrive at this result through a series a transformations. First, we design a generic SMT-PD protocol with linear public communication and O( n n−t ) simple-wire communication (note that this already improves on existing results); second, we consider instantiations of the generic protocol's "black boxes" with different randomness extractors, each providing its own benefits (perfect privacy vis-à-vis smaller message length); and last, we obtain the final protocol by essentially running two perfect-privacy instantiations of the generic protocol in parallel, one for the message itself and a 4 It follows, e.g., that = (n log n) 1+ suffices for any > 0. 5 [10] and [7] have smaller required message size before reaching their claimed complexity-but that complexity is much less optimal (see table) .
"smaller" version for the authentication key. These results are presented in Section III.
As noted above, we also show (Section IV) an ( n n−t ) lower bound on simple-wire communication. The lower bound holds for SMT without public discussion as well. The bound itself is weaker than previous, but it holds for a more general class of SMT protocols. In particular, it is the first communication complexity lower bound to consider non-perfect privacy, as well as the first to allow for the Receiver outputting an incorrect message.
Finally, we show in Section V how amortization can drastically reduce the use of the public channel, allowing sender and receiver to communicate indefinitely after using the public channel twice and a limited initial message. Our approach is to separate Sender and Receiver's interaction following the first execution of SMT-PD into two modes: a Normal Mode and a Fault-Recovery Mode. At a high level, in the Normal Mode, secure communication is successful provided the adversary does not interfere; this is implemented by a one-round protocol satisfying a relaxed version of the problem that we call Weak SMT-PD. Fault-Recovery Mode is entered if corruption is detected. 6 Preliminaries and definitions are given in Section II. For the purpose of readability, some of the proofs, as well as some complementary material, are presented in the appendix. 
II. MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We say that X and Y are -close if (X, Y ) ≤ .
A. The Public Discussion Model
The public discussion model for secure message transmission [7] consists of a Sender S and Receiver R (PPTMs) connected by n communication channels, or simple wires, and one public channel. S wishes to send a message M S from message space M to R. (In our protocols, we take M to be an appropriate finite field.) To this end S and R communicate with each other in synchronous rounds in which one player sends information across the wires and/or public channel. Communication on the public channel is reliable but public; the simple wires may be corrupted and so are not necessarily reliable or private.
A is a computationally unbounded adversary who seeks to disrupt the communication and/or gain information on the message. A may adaptively corrupt up to t < n of the simple wires (potentially all but one!). Corrupted wires are actively controlled by A: he can eavesdrop, block communication, or place forged messages on them. Further, we assume A is rushing-in each round, he observes what is sent on the public channel and all corrupted wires before deciding what to place on corrupted wires, or whether to corrupt additional wires (which he then sees immediately).
An execution E of an SMT-PD protocol is determined by the random coins of S, R, and A (which we denote C S , C R , C A respectively), and the message M S ∈ M. The view of a player P ∈ {S, R, A} in an execution E, denoted View P , is a random variable consisting of P's random coins and all messages received (or overheard) by P. (S's view also includes M S ). Additionally, let View P (M 0 ) denote the distribution on View P induced by fixing M S = M 0 . In each execution, R outputs a received message M R , a function of View R .
We can now define an ( , δ)-SMT-PD protocol (cf. [7] , [10] , and [19] (2) Dec(Enc(x)) = x for all x ∈ K . 7 We say E has rate K /N and relative minimum distance d/N.
For our complexity claims, we require a family of codes of increasing input length which is asymptotically good, that is, E should have constant rate and constant relative minimum distance D = d/N. See, e.g., [25] for a standard reference.
Of particular interest for us are the well-known ReedSolomon codes over F q , obtained by oversampling polynomials in F q [X] . Given an input in F K q , we interpret it as a polynomial f of degree ≤ K −1; to obtain a codeword from f , we simply evaluate it at N distinct points in F q , for any N (provided K < N ≤ q). Indeed, any two such polynomials agree on at most K − 1 points, therefore the Reed-Solomon code has minimum distance N − K + 1.
Our protocols make use of a simple method to probabilistically detect when codewords sent on the simple wires are altered by A. Simply put, the sender of the codeword reveals a small subset of the codeword symbols. Formally, suppose S sends a codeword C ∈ N to R over one of the simple wires, and R receives the (possibly altered) codeword C * .
(If R receives a non-codeword, he immediately rejects it.) Then to perform the consistency check, S chooses a random
where C| J represents the codeword C restricted to the indices in J . If the revealed symbols match, then the consistency check succeeds; otherwise the check fails and R rejects C * as tampered.
Suppose A alters C to a different codeword, C * = C. Since C and C * are distinct valid codewords, they differ in at least a D fraction of symbols. Therefore, the probability that they agree on a randomly chosen index is ≤ 1 − D, and so
Thus, with overwhelming probability ≥ 1 − (1 − D) λ , R will reject a tampered codeword. Of course, the validity of the check depends upon A not knowing J at the time of potential corruption of C.
C. Average Min-Entropy and Average-Case Extractors
Recall that the min-entropy of a distribution X = (X 1 , . . . , X N ) over {0, 1} N is defined as
and gives a measure of the amount of randomness "contained" in a weakly random source. We say a distribution X is a k min -
where U k represents the 7 Note in particular that this allows us to test for membership in the image Enc( K ) by first decoding and then re-encoding. uniform distribution on {0, 1} k ). The input to the extractor is the N-bit k min -source, X, together with a truly random seed s, which is uniformly distributed over {0, 1} D . Its output is an M-bit string which is statistically close to uniform, even conditioned on the seed s used to generate it.
This notion of min-entropy, and of a general randomness extractor, may be an awkward fit when considering an adversary with side information Y as above. In these cases, a more appropriate measure may be found in the average min-entropy of X given Y , defined in [26] by
Note that this definition is based on the worst-case probability for X, conditioned on the average distribution (as opposed to worst-case probability) of Y . The rationale is that Y is assumed to be outside of the adversary's control; however, once Y is known, the adversary then predicts the most likely X , given that particular Y .
[26] use average min-entropy to define an object closely related to extractors:
The similarity to an ordinary extractor is clear. [26] prove the following fact about average min-entropy:
D. Extracting Randomness from F q
We will make use of a special-purpose deterministic (seedless) extractor Ext q which operates at the level of field elements in F q as opposed to bits.
Ext q works not on general min-entropy sources, but on the restricted class of symbol-fixing sources, which are strings in F N q such that some subset of K symbols is distributed independently and uniformly over F q , while the remaining N − K symbols are fixed. Given a sample from any such source, Ext q outputs K field elements which are uniformly distributed over F K q . Ext q works as follows:
(Of course we require N + K ≤ q.) This extractor has proven useful in previous SMT protocols as well (see, e.g., [4] and [6] ).
III. SMT-PD WITH SMALL PUBLIC DISCUSSION
In this section we present our main positive results. First, we construct a basic ( , δ)-SMT-PD protocol, Gen (for "generic"), with optimal simple-wire communication and linear public communication. We then consider possible instantiations of Gen ; using, in particular, Reed-Solomon codes and the extractor Ext q , improves it to a 0-private protocol. Finally, we use Gen (instantiated with Reed-Solomon codes) as a building block to construct our main protocol SPD , which achieves logarithmic public communication while maintaining optimal simple-wire communication (and other desirable properties).
A. A Generic SMT-PD Protocol With Optimal Simple-Wire Communication
Protocol Gen achieves essentially optimal communication complexity on the simple wires of O( n n−t ), where is the length of the message, while maintaining linear communication complexity (in , under mild conditions) on the public channel. (See Section IV for a precise statement of the simple wire lower bound.) This is the first SMT-PD protocol to achieve sublinear transmission rate on the simple wires, and as such provides an affirmative answer to the question posed in [19] of whether O(n) simple-wire transmission rate can be improved.
Gen relies on two primitives as black boxes: an errorcorrecting code E and an average-case strong extractor, Ext A . The efficiency of the protocol depends on the interaction between the basic parameters of the protocol-, δ, , n, and t-and the parameters of E and Ext A . After presenting the protocol and proving its security, we will examine its complexity in terms of these parameters.
At a high level, the protocol has the same structure as previous 3-round SMT-PD protocols: (1) in the first round, one of the parties (in our case R) sends lots of randomness on each simple wire; (2) using the public channel, R then sends checks to verify the randomness sent in (1) was not tampered with; (3) S discards any tampered wires, combines each remaining wire's randomness to get a one-time pad R, and sends C = M S ⊕ R on the public channel. However, our use of extractors allows us to reduce the amount of transmitted randomness, which is reflected in the gain in simple-wire communication.
We remark that one may modify Gen to have interaction order S-R-S, instead of R-R-S as we present it. One advantage of R-R-S is that when instantiated with deterministic extractors (see below), it does not require any random coins for S (in contrast to S-R-S, where both parties use randomness crucially). Now we turn to the details of protocol Gen . Let errorcorrecting code E have encoding and decoding functions Enc : {0, 1} K → {0, 1} N and Dec : {0, 1} N → {0, 1} K , respectively, and relative minimum distance D. (We will specify K below.) While N > K may be arbitrarily large for the purpose of correctness, we will want K /N and D both to be constant-i.e., the code to be asymptotically good-for our complexity analysis.
Second, let Ext A be an average-case (nK, , k min , /2)-strong extractor. Here K is, as above, the source length of the error-correcting code E, and and are the messagelength and privacy parameters of Gen . k min is the min-entropy threshold. Now clearly ≤ k min ≤ nK . On the other hand, we require k min = O( ) for our complexity claim to hold-that is, Ext A should extract a constant fraction of the min-entropy. Further, the extractor's seed length s should be O(n + ). Fig. 2 .
Theorem III.1: Let t < n. Protocol Gen is a (3, 2)-round ( , δ)-SMT-PD protocol with communication complexity O( n n−t ) on the simple wires, and
on the public channel, provided that /(n − t) = (log(t/δ)). Proof: Privacy. We first claim that if we omit C, then A has essentially no information (up to ) on S's output of the average-case extractor, R * = Ext A (α * , seed). Formally:
Recall that α * is, by definition, the concatenation of r * i for i ∈ ACC (padded to length nK ). Let SEC denote the set of secure (simple, uncorrupted) wires. Then for i ∈ SEC, we have that r * i = r i , and therefore
where the latter equality follows since r i is independent of everything in A's view except (J, C i | J ) (and C, which we exclude). Now we apply Fact II.4: since C i | J has at most 2 λ possible values, then
Since the transmissions on the simple wires, and associated codeword verifications, are all mutually independent, we then have
From here the overall claim follows immediately because Ext A is an (nK, , k min , /2)-strong average-case extractor, and R * = Ext A (α * , seed) with seed uniformly random.
The remainder of the proof of -privacy is by contradiction: We show that, if there exists an adversary A and 
Alternatively, suppose the challenger flips tails, and u test is uniform. Then
Putting these together, we discover
which contradicts the above claim. This completes the verification of -privacy.
Reliability. Observe that
The latter event only happens if A succeeds in altering C i without S detecting it. By construction, our consistency check (Section II) guarantees that this happens with probability at most (1 − D) λ = δ/t for a single wire, hence (taking a union bound over corrupt wires) probability at most δ overall.
Complexity. The simple wires are used only in round 1, to send Enc(r i ) on each wire. The total complexity is therefore n N = O(nK ) (for E of constant rate). As noted above, our assumptions on E and Ext A imply that K = O( )/(n − t) + λ, and therefore the total simple wire complexity is
The public channel is used in Rounds 2 and 3. In Round 2, R transmits J ⊂ [N] of size λ, and the restricted codewords
Specializing to the worst-case n = t + 1 gives the simpler but less precise upper bound
In Round 3, S uses the public channel to send (B, C, seed) where B indicates accepted wires, C hides the message M S , and seed is a seed for Ext A . Thus the Round 3 public communication is n+ +s, which is O(n+ ) for any extractor with reasonable seed length.
B. Instantiating the Generic Protocol
Here we consider possible instantiations of Gen . Since our main interest is in 0-private protocols, the most important instantiation will be that with Reed-Solomon codes and the extractor Ext q of Section II. Nevertheless, other choices of (explicit) extractor are possible, and we examine one such in particular.
1) Kamp and Zuckerman's Symbol-Fixing Extractor:
The first extractor we suggest is the deterministic symbol-fixing extractor of Kamp and Zuckerman [27, Theorem 1.3] . This extractor, like Ext q , works for the class of symbol-fixing sources; here the symbols come from an alphabet of constant size d ≥ 3. It is an efficiently computable (n, , O( +1/ ), )-extractor (the O hides constants depending on d); it extracts a constant fraction of min-entropy and has output exponentially close to uniform. Additionally, it works for sources of any minentropy rate-that is, k min has no dependence on n. It also has the advantage of being deterministic, thus obviating the need for S to choose and send a seed in Round 3. In this case, S does not require any random coins at all.
To convert the extractor of Kamp and Zuckerman into an average-case extractor as in Section II, we may invoke the following fact, proven in [26] :
Taking γ = , we obtain a 2 -extractor, while the additional additive error of log(1/ ) is absorbed into the O(log(1/ ))-term already appearing in Kamp and Zuckerman's extractor. Provided that = (2 −c ), we have log(1/ ) = O( ), and so the new min-entropy satisfies k min = O( ), as required in the complexity analysis.
We note that since the extractor of [27] works on alphabets of fixed constant size, it is able to achieve optimal communication complexity for messages of length (nλ), as in Gen . In contrast, the instantiation with Reed-Solomon has a dependence on the field size log q ≈ log( n/(n − t)) as well.
2) Reed-Solomon Codes and the Extractor Ext q :
Statistical error is a feature of all general-purpose randomness extractors. To get around it, we can exploit the fact that the sources arising from Gen are not general min-entropy sources. Rather, conditioning on the adversary's view, each good wire carries independent, uniform randomness, and the corrupt wires carry fixed values. Thus the source we are interested in actually carries quite a great deal of structure. In particular, we may view it as a symbol-fixing source as described in Section II, since we may group bits into symbols, and the adversary has no information on the symbols carried by good wires.
Consider
, which has relative minimum distance 1/2.
We now describe two requirements imposed by this instantiation. First, the description of Gen assumes an extractor which operates on bits rather than field elements. This presents no real problem, as all statements can be recast in a straightforward way to this new setting. However, as mentioned above, the move from {0, 1} to F q does have the effect of adding a log q term to the message length required for optimal communication complexity (see statement of and complexity analysis for Theorem III.4).
Second, we must specify the appropriate field size q in terms of the basic parameters , n, t, δ. Recall λ = log(t/δ) . With foresight, we choose q sufficiently large to satisfy:
For instance, q ≥ nλ + 8 n/(n − t) suffices.
To justify this choice, we observe that there are two requirements on q. First, we need that Ext q : F nK q → F r q is in fact a perfect randomness extractor-so we need q ≥ nK + r . Since K = r/(n − t) + λ, we have:
Thus to get q ≥ nK + r it suffices that (q − nλ) log q ≥ 8 n/(n − t), which is precisely our choice. The second requirement on q comes from the consistency checks: in order for our codeword authentication to be valid, we need q ≥ 2K = N. However this is immediate since we already guarantee q ≥ nK + r , and n ≥ 2 (else SMT-PD is trivial).
C. A SMT-PD Protocol With Logarithmic Public Communication
In this section we present a protocol for SMT-PD which is the first to achieve logarithmic communication complexity (in ) on the public channel. The protocol is perfectly private, achieves the optimal communication complexity of O( n n−t ) on the simple wires, and has optimal round complexity of (3, 2) .
In its Round 3 communication, Gen incurs a cost of on the public channel, which we wish to reduce to O(log ). Our improvement comes from the insight that S can send the third-round message (C, in the notation of Gen ) on the simple wires, provided that S authenticates the transmission (making use of the public channel).
S could simply send C on every simple wire and authenticate C publicly. The downside of this approach is that the simple wire complexity would be ( n) rather than O( n n−t )-no longer optimal. Our solution is to take C and encode it once again using Reed-Solomon into shares C 1 , . . . , C n , each of length ≈ n−t , such that any n − t correct C i 's will reconstruct C. S then sends C i on wire i , and authenticates each C i publicly.
This authentication uses a short secret key, s * , of length λ(n+log( c n−t )) (which is the cost of authenticating n messages of length c /(n −t), using the consistency check of Section II; c is an absolute constant defined below). Thus, S and R will run two processes in parallel: a "small" strand, in which S privately sends the short key to R; and a "big" strand, in which S sends M S to R, making use of the shared key in the third round. The small protocol sends the short key using any reasonably efficient SMT-PD protocol; for ease of exposition, we use Gen , instantiated with Reed-Solomon codes. We also use Gen with Reed-Solomon codes for the big strand of the protocol in order to achieve perfect privacy and optimal simple wire complexity.
We now describe the protocol in detail. Many of the parameters are the same as in (the Reed-Solomon instantiation of) Gen : We set λ = log(t/δ) , and fix a prime q such that
The message space is M = F r q , that is, an -bit message is considered as a sequence of r = / log q field elements in F q . (However, we also assume, for the purpose of the Round 3 authentication, that the field elements are actually represented as bit-strings of length r log q.) Set K = r/(n − t) + λ and N = 2K .
In addition to the above parameters, we will also define their small-strand counterparts, which we notate using variables with hats. Setˆ = λ(n + log(cK log q))-as noted above, this is the length of the shared secret which will be used to authenticate the C i 's. Here the constant c > 1 is the expansion factor of an efficiently computable, constant-rate errorcorrecting code E of relative minimum distance (say) 1/3. (We caution that E plays a different role in SPD than E did in Gen , hence the different name.) We will use Enc and Dec to denote the encoding and decoding functions of E ; we use Enc RS and Dec RS for the encoding and decoding functions of the Reed-Solomon code which functions as E for SPD . Fixq to be a prime such that
Setr = ˆ / logq ,K = r/(n −t) +λ, andN = 2K . Finally, set λ 3/2 = log 3/2 (t/δ) . The protocol, SPD (for "small public discussion"), is shown in Fig. 3 . Keep in mind the high-level understanding of the protocol: The first two rounds are simply parallel versions of Rounds 1 and 2 of Gen , run with different (big and small) parameters. In Round 3, we complete the small instance of Gen as usual, and use the resulting shared secret to blind the (public-channel) authentication of the C i 's which encode C. The latter have been sent on the unreliable simple wires, unlike in Gen , where no authentication was required in Round 3 since C itself was sent on the public channel. (Fig. 3) is a valid (3, 2) Proof: Reliability. We first claim that, with high probability, R receives auth S = (J ,
Theorem III.4: Protocol SPD
is enough to show that s = s * . According to the protocol,
so again it is enough to show thatα =α * . These variables are defined as the concatenations (over i ∈ ACC) off i andf * i respectively (appropriately padded). Thus it suffices to show that for every i ∈ ACC,f i =f * i . This in turn will only fail to be the case provided that A tampers with one of the codewordsĈ i transmitted in Round 1, and is not caught by the consistency check in Round 2. By construction, the probability that A beats the consistency check on a given wire is at most 2 −λ = δ/t, and so the probability that he beats any of the consistency checks at all, is bounded by t · 2 −λ = δ. This proves Claim III.5: Let G 1 be the event in which R receives
Note that if G 1 holds, then the Round 3 consistency check R performs on the E * i 's is done using the correct authentication, auth R = auth S . Nevertheless, R may still incorrectly accept some E * i = E i if A tampers with E i and even the correct authentication vector fails to detect the tamper. We claim that the probability that this happens is also ≤ δ (provided G 1 holds). For in order for R to accept a tampered E * i , it must fail the Round 3 consistency check. Now View A is statistically independent of auth S = (J , {E i | J } i∈ACC ), since the latter is sent using a 0-private instantiation of Gen .
Therefore the Round 3 consistency check is valid, and (since we use a code of relative minimum distance 1/3) the probability A successfully tampers any given corrupt wire is again ≤ (2/3) λ 3/2 = δ/t, and the chance of any successful tampering is ≤ δ. We have thus established Claim III.6: Let G 2 be the event in which the first n − t E * i 's accepted by R are in fact valid (
. (In other words: Provided R uses the correct authentication vector (G 1 ), he will almost certainly accept only valid E *
i 's.) (Note that if G 1 does not hold, then there is no guarantee that R will accept any E * i 's, let alone n − t of them. On the other hand, if it does hold, then R will correctly accept E * i = E i on every good wire i , and the only question is whether he accepts a tampered E * i first (since the protocol has R use the first n − t accepted E * i 's to reconstruct C.) The claim above shows that this bad outcome happens with negligible probability.)
Now if G 1 and G 2 both hold, then it follows that for every accepted
, and hence R decodes correctly using these D * i 's, and we thus have C * = C. In this case, since M S ≡ C − R * and M R ≡ C * − R, reliability will hold provided that R * = R. This last equality is satisfied provided A does not successfully tamper with any of the C i 's sent in Round 1-therefore it is satisfied with probability ≥ 1 − δ. Therefore we have: Claim III.7:
Taking the three previous claims all together, we find:
which completes the proof of 3δ-reliability.
(Perfect) Privacy. The proof is essentially the same as that in the privacy analysis for protocol Gen . In fact it is simpler, since here we specialize to = 0. In a nutshell, suppose we exclude from the adversary's view C = M S + R * (which is to say, we exclude the codewords E i which he could use to reconstruct C). Then according to this restricted view, R * = Ext q (α * ) is distributed uniformly at random over F r q , because Ext q is an error-less extractor. Thus replacing C in his view still gives A no information on M S . Complexity. Our assumption that /(n − t) ≥ /n = (λ log q) is equivalent to r/(n − t) = (λ) (since = r log q). As a result, K = r/(n − t) + λ = O(r/(n − t)), a fact which we use below.
By its definition, = λ(n + log(cK log q))
This is O( ) provided that = (nλ log q), as we assume. Sinceˆ = O( ), and since Rounds 1 and 2 have the same structure for the big and small strands, it follows that the communication complexity in these two rounds is dominated by the big strand, so we consider only those messages. Regarding communication on the simple wires, note that they are used first in Round 1 to send 2K field elements per wire, at a total cost of
The simple wires are used again in Round 3 to send the E i 's, each of which has length cK log q = c n−t . Thus, since we send at most n, we again get communication complexity O( n/(n − t)) on the simple wires.
The public channel is used in Rounds 2 and 3; in Round 2 R specifies λ positions out of [N], and sends a total of nλ field elements. Hence the Round 2 public communication is λ log N + nλ log q. Now we know by our choice of q that q ≥ N = 2K , so the Round 2 public communication is bounded by 2nλ log q.
Let us estimate log q in terms of the basic parameters. Since q ≥ nλ + 8 n/(n − t) suffices, we may certainly choose q ≤ 2(nλ + 8 n/(n − t)) (and now assume we do so). Then
since by assumption /(n − t) ≥ /n = (λ). Thus the Round 2 public communication is
In Round 3, S sends (V, B) publicly. B just has length n, and V has lengthˆ = λ(n + log n−t + O(1)), which are dominated by the Round 2 public communication.
IV. SIMPLE-WIRE COMMUNICATION LOWER BOUND
In this section we prove a lower bound of ( n n−t ) for the expected communication complexity on the simple wires, for any ( , δ)-SMT-PD protocol (where and δ are considered constants). Since protocol Gen of the previous section meets this bound, we provide a complete answer to the question raised in [19] of determining the optimal transmission rate on simple wires for an ( , δ)-SMT-PD protocol.
Our communication lower bound holds even for a weakened adversary who is passive and non-adaptive-that is, A chooses which wires to corrupt at the start of the protocol and only eavesdrops thereafter. It also holds even if we modify δ-reliability so that the probability that M R = M S is taken over the the choice of M S as well (and not just the players' coins). Further, as noted in the Introduction, it also holds in the case of SMT with no public channel, mutatis mutandis.
For the lower bound, we assume that M S is chosen uniformly at random from M; in this case H (M S ) = log |M|. The first two lemmas are complementary, establishing entropy versions of -privacy and δ-reliability, respectively. Namely, in Lemma IV.1, we show that in any -private protocol, the entropy of M S remains high given the adversary's view. Then in Lemma IV.2, we show that for any δ-reliable protocol (with passive adversary), the entropy of M S given the entire transcript of communications is low. Though these statements are quite intuitive, their proofs are relatively delicate. Lemma IV.1: For all adversaries A and all -private protocols, H (M S | View A ) ≥ − log(1/|M| + 2 ). 9 The transcript T of an ( , δ)-SMT-PD protocol execution is the random variable consisting of the list of messages the players send on public and simple channels over the course of the protocol. Thus in the case of a passive adversary, T is completely determined by M S and the coins of S and R. For a given set of wires S, we will let T S denote the transcript restricted to communications on the wires in S. In the sequel we use PUB, SIMP, CORR, and SEC to denote respectively the public channel, simple wires, corrupted wires, and secure (simple and uncorrupted) wires.
We use H 2 (·) to denote the binary entropy function,
. Given Lemmas IV.1 (a proof of "high" entropy) and IV.2 (a proof of "low" entropy), we take the difference of the two inequalities (leaving still a "high" amount of entropy), and show that this bounds from below H (T SEC | SEC). This is intuitive: the adversary knows which wires are secure, and yet it is only from these wires that S and R can leverage any privacy at all. Therefore the entropy of the messages on them should be high:
Lemma IV.3: A secure ( , δ)-SMT-PD protocol with message space M satisfies
Our main lower bound theorem follows. The idea is straightforward. Since the set of secure wires is unknown to S and R (for a passive adversary, say), it must be that, in an average sense, every set of n − t simple wires carries the requisite entropy. Then we use Han's inequality (see proof) to "average" the entropy over all subsets of n − t wires and obtain an estimate for the total entropy on simple wires, completing the proof.
Theorem IV.4: Let be any ( , δ)-SMT-PD protocol with n ≤ 2t, in the presence of a passive, non-adaptive adversary A. Let C denote the expected communication (in bits) over the simple wires (the expectation is taken over all players' coins and the choice of M S ∈ M). Then
In particular, if 
V. AMORTIZED USE OF THE PUBLIC CHANNEL
A natural question when considering SMT-PD as a subroutine in a larger protocol is whether some of the lower bounds on resource use for a single execution of SMT-PD can be beaten on average through amortization. For instance, an almost-everywhere secure computation protocol [7] may invoke an SMT-PD subroutine every time any two nodes in the underlying network need to communicate. Must they use the public channel twice every single time, or can the nodes involved, say, save some state information which allows them to reduce their use of the public channel in later invocations?
Our next result shows that amortization can in fact drastically reduce the use of the public channel: indeed, it is possible to limit the total number of uses of the public channel to two, no matter how many messages are ultimately sent between two nodes. (Since two uses of the public channel are required to send any reliable communication whatsoever [19] , this is best possible.)
Of course, S and R may use the first execution of SMT-PD to establish a shared secret key, which can be used for message encryption and authentication on the simple wires. The Sender computes a ciphertext and sends it (with authentication) on every simple wire. With overwhelming probability, no forged message is accepted as authentic, and the Receiver accepts the unique, authentic message which arrives on any good wire. However, since we are considering the information-theoretic setting, each use of the shared key reduces its entropy with respect to the adversary's view. If the parties know in advance an upper bound on the total communication they will require, and can afford to send a proportionally large shared key in the first execution of SMT-PD, then this approach is tenable by itself.
In some situations, however, the players may not know a strict upper bound on the number of messages they will send. And even when they do, it may happen that the protocol terminates early with some probability, so that an initial message with large entropy is mostly wasted. With these considerations in mind, we now explore strategies which allow S and R to communicate indefinitely after using only two broadcast rounds and a limited initial message. Our approach is to separate Sender and Receiver's interaction following the first execution of SMT-PD into two modes: a Normal Mode and a Fault-Recovery Mode.
In the Normal Mode, S and R communicate over the simple wires without making use of their shared key; they are successful provided the adversary does not actively interfere. If the adversary does interfere, one of the players (say R) will detect this and enter Fault-Recovery Mode, in which he uses the shared key to broadcast information about the messages he received on each simple wire, allowing S to determine at least one corrupted wire (which he then informs R about, authentically).
In this way, S and R communicate reliably and privately so long as the adversary is passive; and any time he is active, they are able to eliminate at least one corrupted wire. 10 (Of course, once they have eliminated all t corrupt wires, communication becomes very efficient.) In the sequel, we describe implementations of Normal Mode and Fault-Recovery Mode, as well as how the two modes interact with each other. a) Normal Mode: Let us first define a weaker version of SMT by public discussion in which reliability is only guaranteed for a passive adversary. Let be a protocol which attempts to send a message from S to R using only the simple wires (and not relying on any shared secret key). Then we say is a Weak ( , δ) SMT-PD protocol if it satisfies Definition II.2 where we (1) add to the adversary's view a bit indicating whether R accepted a message or not (see next point), and (2) replace RELIABILITY with: WEAK RELIABILITY:
(Correctness with passive adversary) If the adversary only eavesdrops, then R receives the message correctly.
(Detection of active adversary) If the adversary actively corrupts any wire, then with probability ≥ 1 − δ, either R receives the message correctly (M R = M S ), or R outputs "Corruption detected." The first change, (1), affects -privacy since it alters the definition of View A ; this is necessary because in the compiled, amortized protocol using Weak SMT-PD as a subroutine, the adversary will learn whether R accepted a message based on whether R does or does not enter Fault-Recovery Mode.
We remark in passing that Weak SMT-PD is similar in spirit to almost SMT from the standard (non-public discussion) model [22] , in that both are relaxations which allow one-round transmission (for Weak SMT-PD, only with a passive adversary). The difference is that in the ordinary model, definitions 10 This is akin to the "slow" PSMT original protocol in [1] .
for almost SMT require that the message be correctly received with overwhelming probability regardless of the adversary's actions; in the public discussion model, when the adversary controls a majority of wires, this is impossible, so we only require that corruptions be detected. Indeed, we cannot guarantee reliability in a single round even when the adversary simply blocks transmission on corrupted wires (otherwise a minority of wires would carry enough information to recover the message, thus violating privacy).
If we do not require the Weak SMT-PD protocol to finish in one round, then there is a simple solution: use the simple wires to simulate the public channel wire in an ordinary SMT-PD protocol. Any time a party would use the public channel, they instead send the public-channel message over every simple wire. Two possibilities arise: (1) The adversary never tampers with any such "virtual" public channel invocation. In this case, the virtual public channel functions like an actual public channel, and the protocol succeeds with the same probability as the underlying SMT-PD protocol. (2) The adversary at some point tampers with a virtual public channel invocation. If he does, then the receiving party in that round will detect tampering, and can notify the other player by sending a flag on every channel (or, if the receiving player is R and it is the final round, he just outputs "Corruption Detected"). 11 The above Weak SMT-PD protocol is conceptually simple (given a pre-existing SMT-PD protocol!), but we might hope to do Weak SMT-PD in a single round, as opposed to the three rounds required for ordinary SMT-PD. The following simple scheme shows one way this can be done.
Assume the Sender wants to send a single field element M S = α ∈ F q . The one-round protocol, W−SMT−PD , is shown in Fig. 4 . Essentially, the sender performs a (3t + 2)-out-of-3n Shamir secret sharing of the message; however, rather than using fixed evaluation points on each wire (such as f (1), f (2), f (3) on wire 1), he chooses a set of random points on which to evaluate f . In this protocol, the only restriction on the field size is q > 3n. Lemma V.1: The protocol of Fig. 4 
is a Weak (δ, δ)-SMT-PD protocol for q > 3n sufficiently large ( (t/δ)).
Proof: If the adversary is passive, it is clear that R will receive the correct message. In this case perfect privacy holds as well, since Shamir secret sharing is perfectly private.
Consider an active adversary. We will look at the worst case, when n = t + 1 (only one good wire). Let f * denote the polynomial of degree ≤ 3t + 1 obtained by interpolating the 3t + 2 shares consisting of all 3t shares on corrupted wires, and the first 2 shares on the one good wire. Without loss of generality, the remaining good share is (x 13 , f (x 13 ) ). Note that R will accept some message precisely if this share lies on f * , which is to say if f * (x 13 ) = f (x 13 ). Otherwise R will detect corruption.
Let us prove weak reliability. Note that if f * = f , then since the remaining share also lies on f , R will correctly output the message f (0) = α = M S . On the other hand, we claim that if f * = f , then R detects corruption with overwhelming probability. Indeed, two distinct polynomials of degree ≤ 3t +1 can agree on at most 3t +1 points. Consider the remaining share (x 13 , f (x 13 )). Conditioned on the set of all other evaluation points chosen by the sender, x 13 is distributed randomly among the remaining q − 1 − (3t + 2) = q − 3t − 3 nonzero points in F q . Thus, since f * and f agree on at most 3t + 1 points,
As noted above, R detects corruption exactly when f * (x 13 ) = f (x 13 ). Hence when f * = f , R detects corruption with probability
Taking q sufficiently large this is ≥ 1 − δ, which proves weak reliability.
Next we turn to δ-privacy. Note that of course if we consider the adversary's view as consisting only of the shares on corrupt wires, then in fact perfect privacy holds, since the secret sharing scheme is perfect. So assume the view also includes knowledge of whether R accepted a message or detected corruption. We say that the adversary materially corrupts the shares ((x i j , y i j ) pairs) on his wires provided that he alters them in some way besides simply permuting them. Clearly, if the adversary only permutes his shares, R will still interpolate f and accept the correct message with probability 1. Such an adversary is for all intents and purposes passive, and perfect privacy holds.
On the other hand we claim that if the adversary materially corrupts, then
Indeed, material corruption implies at least one of the following: (1) altering the y i j value on one of S's evaluation points; or (2) altering the set of evaluation points on corrupted wires. In case (1) it is guaranteed that f * = f , since they disagree on a point. In case (2), let x * i be an altered evaluation point chosen by the adversary. Now, the adversary sees only 3t points in a perfect (3t +2)-out-of-3n secret sharing scheme. Hence, regardless of his prior knowledge (if any) on the value of the secret α = f (0), the value of f at any other point remains uniformly distributed over F q conditioned on his view. Therefore
and it follows that Pr[ f * = f ] ≥ 1 − 1/q, as claimed.
Combining this via union bound with our estimate on the probability of corruption detection given f * = f , we see that in the case of a material corruption, R detects corruption with probability ≥ 1 − 1/q − (t/q) = 1 − (t/q), which again is 1 − δ for q sufficiently large.
It follows that the distribution of the adversary's actual view is δ-close to a modified distribution over views in which material corruption always, with probability 1 results in R's detecting corruption. But a view sampled from this altered distribution is completely independent of the secret α = f (0), since the Shamir sharing is perfect and the adversary can now perfectly predict whether R will detect corruption. The modified adversary has zero advantage in distinguishing any two messages m 0 , m 1 , hence the real adversary, whose view is δ-close, has advantage at most δ in distinguishing them.
Remark. The reader may wonder whether it is necessary to use three shares per wire as in the protocol description. This is done in order that the protocol suffices in the worst case scenario n = t + 1. In such a setting, one share per wire would not suffice: Either the t shares on corrupt wires would determine the polynomial f , meaning no privacy-or they would not, in which case interpolating f requires all t + 1 shares; no redundancy means the adversary may tamper with shares and alter the message at will. Neither would two shares suffice. The reason here is that of the 2n = 2t +2 shares, we would want 2t +1 of them to determine f (similar to above, 2t would mean no privacy and 2t +2 would permit tampering). But in this case if the adversary has some information on the secret α = f (0)-say he knows it is one of two valuesthen he can guess which one and interpolate a candidate for f based on the guess. Then he may alter the evaluation points on corrupt wires while leaving the new shares on the candidate f . If R does not detect tampering, then with high probability the guess for α was correct (and vice versa), which violates privacy. Hence we see that at least three additional shares, beyond those observed on corrupt wires, are necessary. This means that only two shares per wire are necessary when n = t + 2, and only one share per wire if n ≥ t + 3.
We are now ready to describe Normal Mode for S and R: it is simply the repeated execution of the Weak SMT-PD protocol, with the two players alternating the role of Sender and Receiver, until one of them as Receiver outputs "Corruption detected." At that time, that player's next message to the other party will alert them to enter Fault-Recovery Mode.
b) Fault-Recovery Mode: Specifically, suppose R detects corruption in a message sent by S. He will then use the shared secret established in the initial execution of (ordinary) SMT-PD to secretly and authentically send the following on all wires: (1) a flag signalling Fault-Recovery Mode; (2) a list of specific wires known to be corrupted (if any); (3) the received transmission on all wires not known to be corrupt.
Since at least one of the wires is not corrupted, S will receive this communication on it and (verifying its authenticity) enter Fault-Recovery Mode also. S recovers the set of received transmissions and determines which ones were tampered with. He then sends the following to R, again using the shared secret for privacy and authentication: (1) the message M S on which R detected corruption; (2) an updated list of specific wires known to be corrupted. At this time, R has received the intended message and Normal Mode resumes.
Each time Fault-Recovery Mode occurs, S and R are able to detect at least one previously unknown corrupt wire. If at any point S and R have jointly detected t wires as corrupt, they will simply send all future transmissions on the remaining, good wires, guaranteeing perfect privacy and reliability. Theorem V.2: Given an initial shared secret consisting of O(n 2 ) field elements, S and R can communicate indefinitely using only the simple wires. The probability that one of them will ever accept an incorrect message is ≤ tδ. Moreover, with probability ≥ 1−tδ, A gains at most δ information on each of t different messages, and no information on any other message.
Let us first argue that an initial secret consisting of O(n 2 ) field elements is sufficient to realize the scheme described in Section V (using our one-round Weak SMT-PD protocol from Fig. 4) . The shared secret is only used during FaultRecovery Mode. In R's first communication after entering Fault-Recovery Mode, R must encrypt and authenticate a message consisting of a flag, a list of wires, and the entire contents of S's previous transmission. The length of this message is 1+n +(log q)3n = O(n log q). In S's response, he encrypts and authenticates a message consisting of his original message M S and a list of wires, of total length log q + n, which of course is also O(n log q). This entire process occurs at most t times, for a total cost of O(tn log q) = O(n 2 log q). Therefore if S and R share an initial secret consisting of O(n 2 ) field elements of F q using ordinary SMT-PD, they can communicate at least a polynomial number of field elements thereafter, without using the public channel again, before the privacy and reliability errors blow up beyond control.
In fact, as the statement of the theorem indicates, the situation is much better than even that. S and R can actually communicate indefinitely, not just a polynomial number of times. The reason is that, although the privacy and reliability errors may accumulate, these errors only occur when the adversary is (materially) active. And since he is caught with overwhelming probability (≥ 1 − δ) each such time, then with similarly overwhelming probability (≥ 1 −tδ) he is caught the first t times he does it, after which S and R are in the clear.
APPENDIX A SOME ENTROPY FORMULAS
Here we briefly review some facts about entropy. For a good reference, see, e.g., [28] . The entropy of a discrete random variable X (defined over a space X ) is defined as
Entropy provides a measure of the expected information content of X; to be precise, it measures the expected number of bits in a representation of X. The conditional entropy of X given Y , denoted H (X | Y ), expresses the expected additional information given by X if we already know Y . It satisfies the following formula, known as the chain rule for conditional entropy:
Here H (X, Y ) is the entropy of the random variable (X, Y ) in the product space X ×Y; it measures the expected information on learning the values of X and Y (which may be correlated). Some additional formulas which we will find useful include:
APPENDIX B PROOFS
We repeat the statements of the claims here for convenience. Lemma IV. 1 For all adversaries A and all -private protocols, H (M S | View A ) ≥ − log(1/|M| + 2 ).
Proof: Let V denote the support of View A , and for brevity let V = View A . By the -privacy condition, we have that for any two messages m 0 , m 1 
Summing over messages m 0 , we obtain that for all m 1 ∈ M:
For any fixed v ∈ V, let m v denote a maximally probable value of M S , given that View A = v. That is, for all m 1 ∈ M,
We then remove all summands in the previous inequality except those with m 0 = m v , which results in the valid inequality (for all m 1 ∈ M):
Now consider
where the next-to-last line is an application of the log sum inequality. 12 Finally, we can substitute (2) into (3) to obtain
The proof of the lemma follows from a series of several claims.
Call a given transcript 
Our next claim relates the probability that M S = M 0 , given fixed transcript τ and coins for R, to the probability of M S = M 0 given only the transcript τ . Considering only the numerator of this expression to begin with, we have: The last equality may be easier to understand if you work backwards from the last line to the previous one. Viewed thus, the equality says that we obtain the probability of a fixed message M 0 , S's coins c s , and transcript τ ; by summing over all coins for R, the probability that the message and coins appear, conditioned on the fact that the transcript generated by the message and coins in that summand is in fact τ . Continuing from the previous line: 
We estimate the sum by splitting its domain depending on whether τ is good or bad. Consider first the sum over bad τ :
Moving to the sum over good τ , we re-interpret it as an entropy H ((M S ) good | T good ), where the random variables are those induced by restricting the space of executions to ones which produce good transcripts. Then we apply Fano's inequality [28] , which states that for random variables X, Y over a discrete space S, ifp = Pr[X = Y ], then H (X | Y ) ≤ H 2 (p) +p log(|S| − 1).
In our case this becomes
where the second line applies Fano's inequality to the fact that (for good transcripts) Pr[M S = M max (τ )] ≤ √ δ (Claim B.3). Combining the two estimates, we see that
as required. Proof: Since a secure ( , δ)-SMT-PD protocol must work for any adversary A, it is enough to show that the inequality holds when A is passive and uses randomness only to decide which wires to corrupt. In this case View A = (T PUB∪CORR , SEC).
By Lemmas IV.1 and IV.2 and the properties of entropy, we have (assuming A is passive): 
In particular, if = O(1/|M|) and δ = O(1), then C = ( n/(n − t)).
Proof: Let A be a passive adversary who chooses t wires uniformly at random to corrupt. Let T refer to the space of possible transcripts, and likewise for a wire i or set of wires S, let T i and T S denote the space of possible restricted transcripts T i and T S . We aim to apply the previous lemma, and to that end Additionally,
